Alasdair MacDonald v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
Decision date: 14 April 2010
Neutral citation: [2010] UKFTT 172 (TC)
Overall AI summary confidence: medium
Short overview
This short overview is intended to summarise the case, issues and outcome so far as they are supported by the judgment.
AI confidence in this short overview: medium
This case concerns Mr MacDonald’s application for permission to appeal out of time against HMRC Closure Notices disallowing carry-forward loss relief for 2005–06 and 2006–07. The Tribunal considered whether he had a "reasonable excuse" under TMA s.49 for failing to appeal within the 30‑day statutory period and whether he gave notice without unreasonable delay after any excuse ceased. The Tribunal found his reliance on a belief that no categorical list of "trades" existed and on correspondence with ministers did not constitute a reasonable excuse, and dismissed the application for permission to appeal out of time.
Ratio decidendi
This summary is intended to identify the ratio decidendi, meaning the legal reasons for deciding and the binding part of the decision.
AI confidence in this ratio decidendi summary: medium
The Tribunal treated as determinative that a litigant’s subjective belief that no appropriate statutory category exists and mere reliance on correspondence with ministers (or awaiting ministerial replies) do not, without more, amount to a "reasonable excuse" for missing statutory appeal deadlines under TMA s.49; applicants who could with reasonable diligence have discovered grounds for appeal within the statutory period are unlikely to establish such an excuse.
Obiter dicta
This summary is intended to identify obiter dicta, meaning observations made by the way that were not necessary to deciding the case and are not binding.
AI confidence in this obiter dicta summary: medium
The judgment reiterated existing Tribunal guidance that permission to appeal out of time is exceptional and discretionary, requiring balancing factors such as whether there was a reasonable excuse, whether the appellant acted promptly once the excuse ceased, any prejudice to the respondent, and the public interest in finality; and that the presence of arguable merits is not usually decisive when granting late permission.