Mr Mervyn Cox Mr Michael Cox Mr Colin Cox Mr John Londal v Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
Decision date: 11 December 2009
Neutral citation: [2010] UKFTT 51 (TC)
Overall AI summary confidence: high
Short overview
This short overview is intended to summarise the case, issues and outcome so far as they are supported by the judgment.
AI confidence in this short overview: high
Four taxpayers appealed HMRC decisions about postponement of tax for the year to 5 April 2005; the Tribunal held it had no jurisdiction to entertain appeals against HMRC's exercise or refusal of discretion under B(4A)(b) TMA and struck those parts out, but it did have jurisdiction under s.55(3)(b) TMA to determine postponement references. The Tribunal dismissed the postponement applications of Mr Michael Cox, Mr Colin Cox and Mr John Londal for failure to state an amount believed to be overcharged and lack of reasonable grounds, and ordered postponement of £924,000 for Mr Mervyn Cox (with a net indicated payable of £520,000). Parties may apply for permission to appeal the strike-out under the relevant rule.
Ratio decidendi
This summary is intended to identify the ratio decidendi, meaning the legal reasons for deciding and the binding part of the decision.
AI confidence in this ratio decidendi summary: high
The Tribunal held that decisions under B(4A)(b) TMA — HMRC’s discretionary exercise or refusal to exercise provisional repayment powers — are not appealable to the Tribunal under the Rules (no jurisdiction to review such discretion), and that under s.55(3)(b) TMA a reference for postponement requires a prior application to HMRC and a stated amount believed to be overcharged such that failure to state an amount undermines reasonable grounds for postponement.
Obiter dicta
This summary is intended to identify obiter dicta, meaning observations made by the way that were not necessary to deciding the case and are not binding.
AI confidence in this obiter dicta summary: medium
The Tribunal observed (not as binding ratio) that certain procedural defects — for example whether an earlier written application had been made or whether an appeal was verbally withdrawn — can be treated on the evidence rather than automatically constituting jurisdictional bars, and that failure to state an amount overcharged can be regarded as going to the merits rather than solely to jurisdiction.