Andrew Parish v The Commissioners for HMRC
Decision date: 18 September 2026
Neutral citation: [2026] UKFTT 1350 (TC)
Overall AI summary confidence: medium
Short overview
This short overview is intended to summarise the case, issues and outcome so far as they are supported by the judgment.
AI confidence in this short overview: medium
This case concerns Andrew Parish’s appeal against a personal liability notice issued under Schedule 24 following a tribunal decision denying input tax on Kittel grounds. HMRC sought to strike out parts of the appeal and argued Schedule 24 penalties could be used; the appellant contended that for VAT periods commencing on/after 16 November 2017 penalties must be imposed under the post‑2017 VAT penalties regime (ss 69C/69D VATA). The tribunal refused broad strike‑out, concluding the appellant’s core challenge that the newer regime may displace Schedule 24 has a realistic prospect of success and merits fuller argument, while disallowing certain late or unpleaded points.
Ratio decidendi
This summary is intended to identify the ratio decidendi, meaning the legal reasons for deciding and the binding part of the decision.
AI confidence in this ratio decidendi summary: low
No clear binding ratio can safely be identified from the notes because the tribunal did not finally determine the statutory question; it only held that the appellant’s primary contention (that the ss 69C/69D regime may displace Schedule 24 for periods from 16 November 2017) has a realistic prospect of success and requires fuller judicial consideration.
Obiter dicta
This summary is intended to identify obiter dicta, meaning observations made by the way that were not necessary to deciding the case and are not binding.
AI confidence in this obiter dicta summary: medium
The tribunal made procedural observations—criticising HMRC’s late service of a statement of case and the appellant’s late reliance on Human Rights Act arguments—as procedural defects or matters of timing rather than determinative law. It also noted (without deciding) that anti‑double‑penalty provisions do not alone resolve whether the new regime displaces older penalty powers.